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Does full public financing of legislative elections 
make races more competitive? Richard Powell 
analyzes the impact of the Maine Clean Elections 
Act (MCEA) on house and senate elections since its 
passage in 2000. Using statistical analysis, he 
concludes the MCEA has not significantly increased 
competiveness, even though candidates have been 
able to rely substantially less on private contributions 
and the financial disparity between candidates has 
decreased significantly. Powell suggests that analysis 
of the Maine case will be useful as the nation and 
other states consider public-financing laws compa-
rable to the MCEA.    
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INTRODUCTION
In the words of the well-known political scientist Robert Dahl, “In a democratic vision, opportu-
nities to exercise power over government of the state 
ought to be distributed equally among citizens” 
(Dahl 1996: 639). The current system of financing 
U.S. elections, based largely on private donations, 
and the importance of money in determining election 
outcomes, have led many observers to doubt whether 
the U.S. succeeds in reaching Dahl’s standard. As a 
result of widespread concerns that elections—and 
thus the affairs of government—were being unduly 
influenced by special interest groups through their 
campaign donations, many states have implemented 
some form of public financing of state legislative 
elections. In the vast majority of those states, levels 
of candidate participation are very low due to insuffi-
cient funding and regulatory control. In 2000, Maine 
and Arizona, however, became the first states in the 
U.S. to offer full public financing of their legislative 
elections in a way that has encouraged widespread 
participation.
The Maine Clean Elections Act (MCEA),  
enacted via a ballot initiative in 1996, is a voluntary 
system overseen by the Maine Ethics Commission. 
Candidates choosing to participate in the system  
are required to raise a limited amount of money in 
the form of small private donations to prove their 
viability. Once designated as clean-elections candi-
dates, they receive campaign funds from the taxpayer-
funded system. The amount disbursed to each 
candidate varies, but it averaged $6,695 in the house 
and $34,103 in the senate in 2008. Not all candidates 
received that much money, however, due to the 
disbursement of matching funds in some races.  
If a MCEA candidate faces a non-MCEA opponent, 
he or she receives matching funds to balance out the 
difference. In exchange for accepting public funding, 
MCEA candidates are not permitted to raise any 
additional outside funds from private donations  
for use in their own campaigns. Participation rates 
have been high due to relatively high funding  
levels—by Maine standards—and the matching-fund 
provision, which significantly reduces the possible 
advantages of non-participation.
Perhaps owing to the 
recentness of these reforms, little 
research has yet addressed the 
impact of full public financing 
on state legislative elections.  
To fill that void, I conducted  
a study to examine the impact  
of MCEA on legislative elections 
in the state. Because public-
financing laws have been 
proposed at the national level 
and in a number of other states, 
this study provides us with an 
early glance at the implications 
of such reforms. How many 
candidates are currently 
accepting public funds? Does 
public financing make elections 
more or less competitive 
(controlling, of course, for a 
range of electorally relevant 
factors)? Are incumbents more 
or less secure under public 
financing?  
PUBLIC FUNDING OF ELECTIONS
The link between electoral institutions and demo-cratic representation has been a perennial issue 
in U.S. political history. Numerous reforms—the 
Australian (secret) ballot, voter-registration laws, direct 
primaries, and many others—have aimed to strengthen 
the bonds of representation between U.S. citizens and 
their elected officials, while attempting to limit the 
influence of special interest groups. In recent decades, 
much of the focus of electoral reform has been on the 
campaign-finance system. For example, following the 
Watergate scandal, Congress enacted the far-reaching 
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 (FECA), 
which mandated full disclosure of all campaign contri-
butions and placed limits on political donations. FECA 
also set up an optional system of publicly financed 
elections for the presidency, paid for by taxpayer contri-
butions via the check-off option on their yearly tax 
returns. The goal, of course, was to remove the finan-
cial dependence of candidates on private donors. In 
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glance at the impli-
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opposition to various regulations. Another strain of 
research has sought to measure what donors receive  
in return for their campaign donations. 
Although there is a limited literature examining 
the effects of partial public financing on state election 
outcomes (see Jones 1981; Penning and Smidt 1983), 
no study has yet provided a comprehensive examina-
tion of the effects of full public financing on state  
politics. The work of Mayer and Wood (1995) is 
typical of the limited research that exists on the topic. 
In their analysis of partial public funding in Wisconsin, 
they found that such laws reduced the funding 
disparity between challengers and incumbents, but 
failed to make state legislative elections more competi-
tive overall. Contrary evidence was provided by Goidel 
and Gross (1996) who ran a series of sophisticated 
quantitative simulations that showed public financing 
generally leads to more competitive elections. Their 
findings were consistent with those of Donnay and 
Ramsden (1995) and Malbin and Gais (1998) who 
found that Minnesota’s partial public financing laws  
led to more competitive elections in that state. 
Unfortunately, studies of Minnesota and Wisconsin’s 
campaign-finance systems are of limited use due to  
low levels of funding and candidate participation. Yet, 
these limited and inconclusive findings are about all we 
have in understanding the impact of public financing 
on state government. Due to the limited amount of 
research conducted to date, our understanding of this 
area of growing importance is grossly incomplete. In 
particular, we do not have a full understanding of the 
effects of public financing on electoral outcomes. 
DATA AND ANALYSIS
To assess the impact of public financing on legisla-tive elections in Maine, I compiled a dataset of 
all candidates running in the general election for the 
Maine House of Representatives and Senate from 
1994 to 2008.1 Although MCEA did not take effect 
until the 2000 election cycle, I extended the dataset 
back to 1994 to adequately capture any trends that 
were already ongoing in Maine when MCEA took 
effect. Thus, this study spans the first five elections 
with public financing along with the three prior elec-
tions. For each legislative candidate, I collected data 
doing so, reformers hoped to weaken the ties between 
special interest groups and elected officials, instead 
making office-holders more responsive to their constit-
uents (Corrado et al. 1997; Jacobson 2001). In 2002, 
sweeping new regulations in the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act (BCRA) sought to close a number of 
financing loopholes along with adding new restrictions 
on campaign donations.
Since the 1970s there have been a number of 
unsuccessful attempts to extend public-finance laws to 
races for Congress. For example, one such proposal was 
unsuccessfully promoted by Senator George Mitchell 
(D-Maine) during his tenure as Senate Majority Leader. 
Although more than 20 states have enacted some  
form of partial public financing of state elections, only 
two states—Maine and Arizona—offered full public 
financing of state legislative elections as of 2006, joined 
by Connecticut in 2008. Following the lead of Justice 
Louis Brandeis, political commentators have sometimes 
referred to state governments as the “laboratories of 
democracy” because lessons learned from state-level 
reforms can be applied in other states or at the national 
level. For that reason, Maine’s experience with full public 
financing holds great significance for ongoing debates 
about campaign-finance reform across the nation.
The general topic of campaign finance has been 
the subject of a great deal of research in political 
science. The existing research, almost exclusively 
concerned with national politics, has tended toward a 
few broad types—empirical studies aimed at assessing 
why some candidates fare better than others in raising 
money, the impact of campaign finance on election 
outcomes, and normative arguments in support or 
table 1 Percentage of Candidates Accepting MCEA Funds,  
 2000–2008
House (%) Senate (%)
2000 29.2 50.7
2002 60.2 73.2
2004 78.5 79.5
2006 79.9 86.5
2008 83.2 79.7
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of private contributions raised by legislative candidates 
has decreased significantly in both the house and 
senate. In the three elections prior to MCEA, house 
candidates raised an average of $4,899 from private 
contributors and their counterparts in senate races 
raised $20,911. Under MCEA, there has been a 
dramatic decrease in private contributions. From 2000 
to 2008, average fundraising from private sources 
on gender, party affiliation, 
candidate status (incumbent, 
challenger, or candidate in 
an open-seat race), campaign 
funding, and the percentage 
of votes received. Voter-
registration data were collected 
for each district in each election 
cycle also. 
Public Funding and 
Candidate Entry
At first glance, the data 
clearly attest to the success 
of MCEA in enticing 
candidates to accept public 
financing and the accompa-
nying regulations. As shown 
in Table 1, by 2002, the 
second election under 
MCEA, more than 60 
percent of house candidates 
and nearly three-quarters of 
senate candidates partici-
pated in the new system. 
Moreover, participation 
rates rose steadily over the 
next three election cycles. 
By 2008, 83 percent of 
house candidates and 
almost 80 percent of senate 
candidates accepted public 
financing. As shown in 
Table 2, MCEA has been 
effective in getting the 
participation of incum-
bents, challengers, and 
candidates in open-seat 
races, with all three types of candidates generally  
participating about 80 percent of the time. 
As discussed earlier, one of the chief aims of 
MCEA’s proponents was to reduce the amount of 
money being raised and spent in Maine’s legislative 
elections, particularly private contributions. The data 
presented in Table 3 show that those goals have been 
only partially met. Under MCEA, the average amount 
table 2: Percentage of Candidates Accepting MCEA Funds  
 by Incumbency Status, 2000–2008
HOUSE SENATE
Incumbent  
(%)
Challenger  
(%)
Open  
(%)
Incumbent  
(%)
Challenger  
(%)
Open  
(%)
2000 23.1 27.5 41.2 50.0 65.0 40.0
2002 44.2 66.7 68.9 80.0 69.6 69.6
2004 73.4 79.5 83.7 86.4 81.8 72.4
2006 82.1 80.2 76.0 81.5 87.9 92.9
2008 80.9 80.0 89.7 76.9 78.6 85.0
  
table 3:  Mean Fundraising and Expenditures by Candidate, 1994–2008
HOUSE SENATE
Private  
Funds ($)
MCEA  
Funds ($)
Total 
Expenditures 
($)
Private  
Funds ($)
MCEA  
Funds ($)
Total  
Expenditures  
($)
1994 3,796 -- 4,000 20,479 -- 20,232
1996 5,234 -- 4,989 20,808 -- 19,299
1998 6,482 -- 5,974 24,523 -- 22,012
2000 3,699 ++ 4,519 10,881 ++ 22,581
2002 2,635 3,812 5,921 8,800 18,024 22,947
2004 1,574 5,737 6,529 7,447 25,077 32,614
2006 1,989 7,672 8,079 4,876 32,556 33,671
2008 1,459 6,695 7,137 3,942 34,103 31,890
1994–1998 
(mean)
4,899*** 4,984*** 20,911***       20,515***
2000–2008 
(mean)
1,828*** 6,489*** 5,732***      28,898***
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
++MCEA funds were disbursed to candidates, but the state’s online disclosure system was not yet fully functional.
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elections more competitive. Numerous studies have 
shown that U.S. elections, including those for state 
legislatures, have become less competitive in recent 
decades (see, for example, Jacobson 2001). One of the 
chief reasons behind this noncompetitiveness has been 
the enormous electoral advantage enjoyed by incum-
bents. The advantages of incumbency are numerous 
and have been studied exhaustively by political scien-
tists. Undoubtedly, chief among them is the significant 
advantage that incumbents enjoy over challengers in 
raising campaign funds. Even in open-seat races, better-
funded candidates are typically in an advantageous 
position relative to their opponents. 
Political scientists have generally measured the 
broad concept of “competitiveness” in at least three 
specific ways. In its most basic form, a competitive 
election is one that is contested. In a healthy demo-
cratic system, voters should have different candidates 
from whom to choose. In situations where incumbents 
are perceived to hold an insurmountable advantage, 
however, potential challengers may not be willing to 
undertake a campaign. Advocates of publicly funded 
campaigns have argued that such reforms will increase 
the number of candidates by removing one of the 
largest barriers to candidate entry—relative disadvan-
tages in fundraising capacity. The margin of victory of 
winning candidates is another means of assessing the 
competitiveness of elections. Numerous studies have 
demonstrated the link between fundraising and votes 
won. By equalizing the playing field in terms of 
campaign funding, public financing should lead to 
narrower margins of victory for winning candidates, 
other things being equal. Ultimately, electoral competi-
tiveness can be measured by the reelection rate of 
incumbents. In other words, does public financing 
actually reduce the advantages of incumbency to such 
an extent that challengers are more likely to win?
Table 4, which shows the average advantage in total 
expenditures of winning candidates over their oppo-
nents, provides evidence that MCEA has been successful 
in narrowing the funding gap between candidates. In 
house races with incumbents running for reelection, 
winning candidates (almost always incumbents) spent 
an average of $2,189 more than their opponents from 
1994 to 1998. Under MCEA, this funding gap has 
been cut by more than 60 percent to $896. The senate 
decreased to $1,828 in the house and $5,732 in the 
senate. Overall, the amount of direct private contribu-
tions to Maine’s legislative candidates has dropped by 
more than 60 percent under MCEA.2
Of course, elections are still costly affairs, so candi-
dates have relied on MCEA funds to fill the void. In 
the 2008 election cycle, candidates accepted an average 
of $6,695 in MCEA funds in house races and more 
than $34,000 in senate races. In this regard, the perfor-
mance of MCEA has been mixed. Although candidates’ 
reliance on private funding has decreased substantially, 
total expenditures have increased significantly. From 
1994 to 1998, the average candidate spent a total of 
$4,984 in house races and  $20,515 in senate races. 
Under MCEA, from 2000 to 2008 the total per candi-
date expenditures rose to $6,489 and $28,898 in the 
house and senate, respectively. 
Bivariate Analysis:  
An Initial Look at Competitiveness
As already discussed, one of the chief goals  
of public financing’s proponents has been to make  
table 4: Advantage in Total Expenditures by Winning  
 Candidates in Contested Races, Open-Seat and 
 Non-Open-Seat Races, 1994–2008
HOUSE SENATE
Incumbent  
($)
Open Race  
($)
Incumbent  
($)
Open Race  
($)
1994 2,356   793 8,073  5,166
1996 1,733 1,690 10,244  7,622
1998 2,491 4,122 11,533 -8,534
2000 1,750 1,602 -1,220 9,426
2002 1,726 1,634 3,027  5,388
2004   482   160 -9,756  4,416
2006   571 1,530  2,263  6,224
2008   260 1,080   771 12,511
1994–1998 
(mean)
   2,189*** 1,803 10,117***  4,680
2000–2008 
(mean)
    896*** 1,188 -656***  7,462
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
View current & previous issues of MPR at: mcspolicycenter.umaine.edu/?q=MPR Volume 19, Number 2  ·  MAINE POLICY REVIEW  ·  51
IMPACT OF MAINE’S CLEAN ELECTIONS ACT
by a margin of 22 percent in the house and 23.7 
percent in the senate. From 2000 to 2008, this 
dropped to 21.8 percent in the house and 20.1 percent 
in the senate. Nevertheless, both decreases were slight 
and not statistically significant. Similarly, the average 
margin of victory in both houses in open-seat races did 
not change in a statistically significant way.
Finally, we need to ask whether these small, statis-
tically insignificant changes in contestedness and 
margin of victory have resulted in a decrease in the 
incumbency reelection rate. After all, in races with 
incumbents, the average margin of victory, although 
slightly smaller, has remained greater than 20 percent. 
My analysis found that incumbent reelection rates have 
not changed in a statistically significant way under 
MCEA. In the house, incumbents have actually been 
reelected at a slightly higher rate under MCEA (88.0 
percent compared with 85.6 percent previously), with  
a modest decrease in the senate (90.0 percent under 
MCEA compared with 95.4 percent previously). 
In sum, a first glance at the data suggests that the 
goal of MCEA in creating greater electoral competitive-
ness has not been met. Neither house nor senate races 
have been contested at a statistically significant higher 
rate. Further, neither incumbents’ average margin of 
victory nor their overall reelection rate has changed in  
a statistically significant way. 
These trends provide us with an interesting starting 
point in assessing the impact of MCEA on electoral 
competition in Maine. Yet, during this same time 
period there have been a number of other potentially 
relevant factors that may have influenced competitive-
ness. For example, as mentioned earlier, Maine began 
experienced an even more dramatic change. From 1994 
to 1998, winning candidates outspent their opponents 
by more than $10,117. However, from 2000 to 2008, 
losing candidates actually outspent winners by an 
average of $656. The changes for both the house and 
senate were statistically significant. On the other hand, 
the funding differences between winning and losing 
candidates in open-seat races, much smaller to begin 
with, have not changed in a statistically significant way 
under MCEA in either the house or senate.
As a first test, I examined the three measures of 
competitiveness by comparing the time periods of 
1994–1998 with 2000–2008 for each one. The first 
question we need to address is: Has the number of 
contested seats risen under MCEA? The average 
number of contested house races has increased under 
MCEA from 125 during the 1994–1998 period to 
134.6 in the 2000–2008 period and from 32.3 to 33.2 
in the senate over the same period. Neither change, 
however, is statistically significant. The senate results,  
in particular, are not surprising given the rate at which 
senate races have been contested by Republicans and 
Democrats. Typically, the major parties have made 
extensive efforts to recruit a candidate for every senate 
seat. This has been particularly true over the time 
period examined in this study because of the pivotal 
nature the senate has played in key state issues and 
because the parties have been closely divided. 
Legislative term limits, in effect in Maine since 1996, 
have also likely contributed to the large number of 
contested senate seats. As members of the house have 
been term limited, many of them have chosen to run 
immediately for the senate. Further, Moen, Palmer  
and Powell (2005) found that the power of the Maine 
senate has increased at the expense of the house under 
term limits, as more experienced members have 
migrated to the senate.
The second measure of competitiveness is the 
margin of victory of winning candidates. I analyzed the 
average margin of victory in house and senate races by 
year, broken down by races in which incumbents were 
running for election and open-seat races in which they 
were not. Under MCEA, the average margin of victory 
has decreased slightly in non-open-seat races in both 
the house and the senate. From 1994 to 1998, races 
with incumbents running for reelection were decided 
By equalizing the playing field in  
terms of campaign funding, public 
financing should lead to narrower  
margins of victory for winning  
candidates, other things being equal. 
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challenger by six percent in the house, a statistically 
significant change. MCEA has not been associated with 
a statistically significant increase in contested senate 
seats, however, probably due to the high rate of 
contestedness these races experienced even before 
public financing. 
In open-seat races, public financing does not 
increase the likelihood of contested seats in either the 
house or senate. Similar to the senate results, this may 
be because open seats were already more likely to be 
contested; there just is not much room for a statistically 
significant increase to occur in open-seat races. Prior 
research suggests this may be even truer since the 
advent of term limits in 1996, as potential challengers 
wait for open seats, knowing that any incumbent has  
at most eight years in office.
In relation to the second measure of competitive-
ness, margin of victory, MCEA has resulted in closer 
vote margins by just more than three percent in house 
races when challengers accept public financing, a statis-
tically significant change. The results suggest, however, 
that incumbents may be able to partially offset that gain 
by accepting public financing themselves. In the senate, 
public financing for either candidate did not have a 
statistically significant impact on margin of victory. 
In open-seat races, the acceptance of public 
financing by the losing candidate narrowed the winner’s 
margin of victory in both the house and senate. In 
house races, this resulted in a narrowing of the margin 
of victory by 3.3 percent; the impact was even greater 
in the senate with a change of nearly six percent. 
Turning to our final measure of competitiveness,  
I sought to determine the impact of MCEA on the 
likelihood of an incumbent victory in non-open-seat 
races. The results show that MCEA funding can have 
an impact on the likelihood of an incumbent victory, 
depending upon which candidates participate. The 
probability of a challenger defeating an incumbent 
increases by five and ten percent in the house and 
senate, respectively, when the challenger accepts public 
funding. Incumbents can more than negate those gains, 
however, by accepting public funds for their own 
campaigns. Taken as a whole, the results indicate that 
incumbents benefit disproportionately from MCEA 
once they make the decision to accept public funds, 
regardless of whether the challenger participates. 
imposing legislative term limits in 1996. Increased elec-
toral competitiveness was also one of the primary goals 
of that reform. Another potentially complicating factor 
is that Maine’s legislative districts were redrawn 
following the 2000 census, some of them very signifi-
cantly due to the large-scale population shifts in some 
areas of the state since the 1990 census. The new 
districts took effect with the 2004 election. Obviously, 
any impact of MCEA in terms of competitiveness may 
be clouded by changes in voter partisanship in the 
various districts. For these reasons, it is necessary to 
subject these initial findings to more rigorous examina-
tion using multivariate analysis.
Multivariate Analysis:  
Assessing Electoral Competitiveness
To isolate the effects of MCEA on whether elec-
tions were contested, I analyzed the data using more 
advanced multivariate statistical modeling, designed  
to control for the effects of a wide range of variables  
on one another. For example, my analysis took into 
account the partisan mix of voters and past voting 
patterns in each legislative district. In doing so, I 
expected that the larger the size of the majority party’s 
advantage in a district, the less likely a race would be 
contested. In making the choice of whether or not to 
run, potential candidates certainly weigh the costs of 
running against their perceived chance of winning.  
As the percentage of voters from the opposite party 
increases, the chances of winning decrease. Similarly,  
I expected that a challenger will be less likely to run as 
the incumbent’s past percentage of the vote increases.3
The results from these analyses show a number  
of interesting things. For example, in districts with 
incumbents running for reelection, MCEA has 
increased the probability of an incumbent facing a 
…public funding may not be the panacea 
that its supporters wished it would be, nor 
does it substantially reduce the electoral 
advantage enjoyed by incumbents. 
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campaign finance, MCEA has been compromised by 
some significant loopholes. Despite widespread partici-
pation in a system in which candidates are forbidden 
from accepting private contributions, outside money 
continues to pour into the system. For example, under 
MCEA individual legislators are permitted to create 
leadership political action committees (PACs) that are 
substantially unregulated. Further, MCEA candidates 
can raise money for these PACs. Like the soft-money 
loophole in pre-BCRA U.S. national elections, these 
PACs have been able to raise large sums of money that 
can be used to influence particular races. The major 
restriction is that leadership PACs are not permitted to 
serve as conduits between specific donors and candi-
dates. In other words, donors are not permitted to have 
any involvement in how their donations are spent by 
leadership PACs. In short, private campaign contribu-
tions are no longer permitted to candidates accepting 
public financing, but those funds are still being used to 
benefit those candidates in an indirect manner. Since 
leadership PACs are typically used by leaders to further 
their own political interests, they are most likely to 
donate to candidates likely to win—usually incumbents 
and co-partisans in competitive open-seat races.
For the purposes of the present discussion, this 
loophole seems to be severely hampering the effective-
ness of MCEA in reducing the amount of money in 
campaigns and in increasing electoral competitiveness. 
Outside money is still finding its way into legislative 
elections. It is certainly possible that the other goal of 
MCEA—limiting the legislative influence presumed to 
come with contributions—is being furthered since 
candidates do not have direct links with donors. That 
particular topic is beyond the scope of the present 
study, but it is an important avenue for further research.
My findings suggest that public funding may not 
be the panacea that its supporters wished it would be, 
nor does it substantially reduce the electoral advantage 
enjoyed by incumbents. Electoral competitiveness in 
Maine has not been appreciably affected by MCEA. 
Over time, it will be interesting to see if the experience 
of Connecticut—and, perhaps other states considering 
public-financing laws geared toward high participation 
rates—will be similar to Maine’s in its first five election 
cycles with this reform.  
Although the advantage for incumbents is diminished 
when facing an MCEA challenger, the key factor is 
whether or not the incumbent—not the challenger—
participates in MCEA.
DISCUSSION
Public financing of legislative campaigns has been touted by supporters as a means of enhancing elec-
toral competition and reducing the influence of donors 
on the legislative process. My focus here has been the 
first issue: Does public financing increase competitive-
ness? In answering this question, I examined the impact 
of the Maine Clean Elections Act on three measures 
of electoral competitiveness: contestedness, margin 
of victory, and incumbent reelection rate. Taken as a 
whole, the results of my analyses indicate that public 
financing has had only the slightest effects on electoral 
competition for the Maine Legislature. Under MCEA, 
house incumbents are about six percent more likely to 
face a challenger when running for reelection, but this 
has not been the case in the senate. Contested elections 
are no more likely in open-seat races under MCEA 
than before in either the house or senate. Margins of 
victory are slightly smaller in races with MCEA candi-
dates, but the average incumbent still wins by a margin 
of more than 20 percent in the house and senate, and 
winners of open-seat races still win by about 15 percent 
in both houses. In terms of actual wins and losses, chal-
lengers are only more likely to win if they participate 
in MCEA and the incumbent does not. When incum-
bents accept public funding, they are actually more 
likely to win reelection.
In sum, my study found that MCEA has not had  
a significant impact on increasing electoral competition 
for the Maine Legislature even though candidates have 
relied on substantially less in private contributions and 
the financial disparity between candidates has dimin-
ished significantly. It has not benefited challengers, nor 
does it appear to be serving as an “incumbency protec-
tion act” as some observers predicted (see Goidel and 
Gross 1996: 130). So why hasn’t MCEA translated into 
greater competitiveness? The explanation may rest with 
the old adage that money, like water running downhill, 
will always find a way around new campaign finance 
regulations. Like many other efforts to regulate 
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ENDNOTES
1.  Candidate data and election returns were obtained 
from the Maine Secretary of State’s office. Data on 
campaign funding were obtained from the Maine 
Ethics Commission, which oversees and enforces 
Maine’s campaign finance laws. 
2.  All data on campaign funding and expenditures 
used in this study have been adjusted for inflation 
and are presented in constant dollars using 1994 as 
a base.
3.  The results of the multivariate models are summa-
rized here. More detailed information about the 
statistical models employed can be obtained from 
the author.
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